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Chapter 1: Introduction and Purpose of Thesis 
“We must all accept that we cannot abuse the concept of national sovereignty to deny the rest 
of the Continent the right and duty to intervene when, behind those sovereign boundaries, 
people are being slaughtered to protect tyranny."  
–Nelson Mandela 
 
 
The concept of humanitarian intervention in international law is relatively new. 
International law initially focused on the protection of states’ rights and sovereignty1.  
After the failure of the League of Nations, it was apparent that all major powers must be 
permanent members of an organization in order for it to be successful and last the test 
of time. Consequently, with the foundation of the United Nations, the Permanent five or 
P5 (Britain, France, China, Russia, and the United States) of the United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC) were granted exceptional authority; veto power. Veto power 
empowered the leading, powerful states, and it has enabled the UN to outlast the 
lifespan of The League of Nations2. The founding of the veto vote greatly affected 
international issues, including the issue of humanitarian intervention.  
 
Chapter 7 of the United Nations empowers the United Nations Security Council to 
approve intervention into a state. If any P5 state imposes its veto vote, the intervention 
                                                          
1
 The colonization period led to former colony states demanding respect for sovereignty and former 
colonies to demand the same  
2
 In December 1939 The League of Nations expelled the Soviet Union after it attacked Finland. Although 
this may be viewed as an appropriate punitive measure – this action conveyed a weakness, without states 
retaining membership discussion and debate could not ensue. The League lost their potential ability to 
influence the USSR’s policies by expelling them.   
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measure will not receive approval, without this approval an intervention action by a 
state or group of states is considered illegal under international law. Chapter 7 codifies 
the process by which a coalition or state may gain the authority to intervene upon 
another state. There is an exception to this authorization process, which will be 
discussed in the following chapters, named the “Excusable Breach”; a term popularized 
by intervention scholar Jane Stromseth, which suggests that if a coalition of states 
intervenes in a critical situation, they do not need explicit permission from the UNSC to 
have their operation be deemed legal under international law. 
  
The bipolar world that ensued during the Cold War conveys the level of influence and 
interdependence between states even at that time. Globalization is not a recent 
phenomenon. After the conclusion of the Cold War, the international community 
recognized the reach of states’ policies. Looking back at the Cold War, one recognizes 
that every time the President of The United States or the President of the USSR made a 
decision, a ripple effect ensued on a global scale. The world was connected, and with 
the improvement and development of technology, the international community is 
connected more than ever before. This connectedness has altered our perception about 
a multitude of issues, including humanitarian intervention.  
 
With the rise of globalization and the exponential improvement of technology, the 
international community learns of atrocities within mere seconds or minutes. The only 
 6 
question that remains is whether it is the responsibility, or only the right of states to 
intervene upon a state that is abusive towards its people. Hugo Grotius3 stated that 
humanitarian intervention was a right of nations due to the natural law societus 
humana which conveys the universal society of mankind4. Other scholars suggest that it 
is the responsibility of states to intervene when atrocities such as crimes against 
humanity and genocide are occurring. Scholars that believe the latter, including Nicholas 
Wheeler, also suggest that humanitarian intervention is gaining traction as an emerging 
norm.  
 
Affected greatly by recent actions and inactions, international perception of 
humanitarian intervention has evolved. This thesis will examine the case studies of 
Kosovo, Somalia, and Libya. It is imperative to recognize that these case studies, 
although significant, are not the only cases that have affected the perception of 
intervention. Inaction in Rwanda and action in Iraq have also shaped international 
policies of intervention and intervention decisions. The case studies selected have all 
contributed to the discussion of the perception and increased acceptance of the 
practice of intervention.  
 
                                                          
3
 Considered the ‘father’ of international law 
4
 Grotius, Hugo. De Jure Belli as Pacis. Book II, Chapter 25, Section 8, Volume 11. Oxford : Oxford 
University Press, 1925  
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To discuss humanitarian intervention, there needs to be an establishment of a working 
definition of the term itself. The term ‘humanitarian intervention’ is vague in nature. 
What can one define as humanitarian? How can one verify ‘humanitarian’ grounds and 
motivations as opposed to strategic interests? As for the term ‘intervention’, that could 
also convey a multitude of actions. Threats of action or sanctions are not military 
measures, but they are implementations of intervention. Recognizing that international 
law is constantly evolving, definitions are significant; words can come to have different 
meanings, and those definitions will have different legal ramifications. Therefore, in this 
thesis, arguments will be based on humanitarian intervention being an armed 
intervention by a coalition of states into another state to end or prevent mass 
humanitarian atrocities like genocide, war crimes, and ethnic cleansing from occurring.  
 
 
Purpose of thesis: 
 Examine multilateral humanitarian intervention as a universal 
norm of international law 
 Analyze the decision making process, including the political and 
moral reasons, justifications, procedures, and criticisms for the 
interventions in Somalia, Kosovo and Libya to determine the 
existence of guiding commonalities.  
 8 
 Propose model guidelines based on existing and emerging legal 
principles applicable in situations requiring humanitarian 
intervention.  
 9 
 
 
Chapter 2: Status of Humanitarian Intervention 
 
 
Many scholars such as Ignatieff, Brown, Keohane, and others have discussed the issue of 
humanitarian intervention and its status in international law. This thesis will examine 
the positions taken by Nicholas Wheeler, Allen Buchanan, Jane Stromseth, and Michael 
Burton.  
 
States have employed the practice of humanitarian Intervention since the early 1800s, 
yet nowhere have states codified its meaning in international law.  The reasons for this 
omission is understandable – the difficulty of formulating a general principle to cover a 
multitude of situations, the opportunity for its misuse; and  the complex nature of 
achieving stability and beginning nation building, or other factors like geography or 
culture5.    
 
Despite the lack of firm legal foundation, many scholars such as Nicholas Wheeler have 
observed that multilateral humanitarian intervention is achieving a normative status, 
                                                          
5
 Unfamiliar terrain and cultures is a factor when considering intervention, i.e. Afghanistan conveys the 
complexity of military operations due to the tough terrain and the Eastern, Muslim, and Pashtun culture. 
Although the operations in Afghanistan are not of a humanitarian intervention, it conveys the complexity 
of the decision to intervene. You cannot operate the same way in every country. Intervention in Kosovo 
must be dealt differently than the Somalia intervention. Cultures and customs, and familiarity with them 
are imperative. NATO’s partnership with Qatar and the UAE in the Libya intervention is evident of this.  
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which leaves the international community with a sense of obligation, but without a clear 
path of action.  
 
The process of authorizing an intervention is codified in the UN Charter: a state must 
make an appeal to the United Nations Security Council by which the committee may 
authorize military action in accordance with Chapter 7 of the UN Charter.  
 
 
NATO Intervention in Kosovo & Emergence of Excusable Breach Clause: 
Jane Stromseth echoes this view based on the international community’s acceptance of 
NATO’s intervention into Kosovo and the “Excusable Breach Clause.”6 Stromseth argues 
that with humanitarian intervention slowly moving towards normative status, coalitions 
of states that can document mass atrocities can take action without the UNSC’s 
permission – or, more importantly, fear of condemnation.  
 
Scholars such as Allen Buchanan, argue that for an action to reach a normative value it 
must have the support of the majority of citizens.7 Buchanan conveys the difficulty and 
                                                          
6
 Stromseth, Jane, “Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention”, Cambridge University Press 2003, p.244-252 
7
 Buchanan, Allen. “The Internal Legitimacy of Humanitarian Interventions”. Volume 7, Issue 1. Journal of 
Political Philosophy, 16 December 2002. 
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complexity of humanitarian intervention achieving normative status due to the level of 
consent within states that are proponents of intervention. Buchanan is more skeptical of 
intervention currently being an emerging norm. Buchanan further asserts that 
intervening states need the majority support of the intervening state’s public to provide 
legitimacy and credibility to the state and its decisions.  
 
Buchanan further asserts that it is not the ‘duty’ of states to intervene upon other 
states, but states do have a responsibility and duty to their citizens. Intervention 
assumes “that among the legitimate activities of a state are undertakings whose primary 
aim is to protect the rights of persons who are not its citizens.” Buchanan states that the 
latter is unjustifiable. States are only responsible for their citizens, not the international 
community. Although states (and their citizens) may decide to intervene, it is not an 
obligation to act. Buchanan presents these arguments to contradict the notion that 
multilateral intervention is an emerging norm.    
 
Opposing the above arguments, Wheeler insists that over the last two decades the 
world has witnessed the emergence of a new norm authorizing military intervention on 
humanitarian grounds. Wheeler argues this is a recent development, emerging in the 
1990s with the Kurdish situation in Iraq, the intervention in Somalia, and the inaction in 
Rwanda.  
 12 
 
Wheeler argues that another critical step towards the emergence of a norm in regards 
to humanitarian intervention is the NATO intervention into Kosovo. Although NATO 
states in the Security Council wanted to intervene in Kosovo, they faced opposition. The 
UNSC did not approve a military intervention, and Russia, China, and India had been 
standing firm against military action in Kosovo.  
 
The majority of the members of the council did not agree with the ‘opposition triple 
entente’ and refused to condemn the bombings or call for them to cease. The concept 
of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ was invoked by Argentina to justify the bombings8; 
Yugoslavia had been unable to stop the atrocities and ethnic cleansing and therefore the 
international community had to take action. Furthermore, the United States was 
determined not to risk non-involvement, “The Clinton Administration had been stung by 
criticisms of its inaction over Rwanda, and especially Bosnia, and it was determined to 
prevent another humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo”9. The Clinton administration 
wanted to take action, and with the support of NATO, they did; without UNSC approval.  
 
                                                          
8
 Wheeler, Nicholas. “The Humanitarian Responsibilities of Sovereignty: Explaining the Development of a 
New Norm of Military Intervention for Humanitarian Purposes in International Society”, Chapter 3 
9
 Ibid 8 
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On March 26, 1999 the Russian delegation drafted a resolution demanding a halt to the 
bombings in Kosovo10. At that time, five members of the UNSC were NATO members, 
but seven were not: Slovenia, Argentina, Brazil, Bahrain, Malaysia, Gabon, and Namibia. 
Many speculate that countries vote out of fear, or self interest. However, the seven non-
NATO members did not have to publicly voice their opinions – but Bahrain and Malaysia 
chose to do so. The Bahraini representative even said that he could not support the 
resolution because it would have done nothing to rectify “the humanitarian crisis of 
tremendous proportions”11. From this latter statement, one may conclude that states 
do not vote solely based upon Western influence or fear. Rather, they vote based on the 
information available to them.   
 
Although there was resistance towards the Kosovo intervention, the action was not 
condemned. Stromseth, as mentioned earlier, argues that the Kosovo intervention is 
proof of the ‘excusable breach clause’, where a coalition of states intervenes when a 
humanitarian crisis is occurring in another state12. The Foreign Ministers (of the Non-
Aligned Movement) reaffirmed this in Cartagena, nation, in April 2000, with a clear 
statement condemning unilateral action13.  The fact that the group did not condemn a 
                                                          
10
 Wheeler, Nicholas. Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society (paperback). 
Oxford: Oxford University Press 2002. 
11
 Ibid 8 
12
 Ibid 6 
13
“ We wish to reiterate, however, that it is of paramount importance that the 
new opportunities, challenges and problems be addressed by following strictly 
the United Nations Charter. In this context, we wish to reaffirm the principles 
 14 
coalition’s right to intervene in states in crisis, suggests that the excusable breach ‘norm’ 
had gained momentum.  
 
However, even with these considerations of excusable breaches and precedents, realists 
continue to oppose ‘humanitarian’ intervention. Realist theorists like Morgenthau or 
Kennan14 convey the inevitable pursuit of self-interest.  
 
 
SC Resolution 688 – Kurds in Iraq & The Principle of Sovereignty as Responsibility: 
On April 5th, 1991 The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) voted on Resolution 688, 
“ten votes to three (with two abstentions) to term the Iraqi government’s oppression of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
of the Non-Aligned Movement as well as the principles and purposes of the United 
Nations Charter. We also want to reiterate our firm condemnation of all 
unilateral military actions including those made without proper authorization 
from the United Nations Security Council or threats of military action against 
the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of the members of the 
Movement which constitute acts of aggression and blatant violations of the 
principle of non-intervention and non-interference.” 
14
 Kennan, George. “Realities of American Foreign Policy”. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University 
Press, 1954. Morgenthau, Hans. “In Defense of the National Interest”. New York: Knopf  Publishing , 1952, 
and “Politics Among Nations”. 5th edn. New York: Knopf Publishing, 1973 
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the Kurds and Shiites as a “threat to the peace”15. The passage of this resolution was 
unprecedented.  For the first time in its history, the UNSC had transgressed the 
inviolability of state sovereignty and had identified an internal conflict as a threat to 
international peace and security.  
 
Although Resolution 688 broke precedent, the UNSC failed to impose “the threat of 
enforcement action”16, making the resolution less powerful than first appearance. Also 
of note is the UNSC failure to approve a French resolution to intervene on behalf of the 
Kurds a few days previously. Therefore one must be cautious on how much weight this 
resolution carried in terms of the creation of a new norm of intervention.  
 
When Iraq refused to stop oppression of the Kurdish population, the USA, UK, France, 
and The Netherlands deployed military forces17 to Iraq to create ‘safe havens’ for the 
Kurdish population. However, this action was not legally authorized by the UNSC, 
President Bush instead claimed it as a legitimate action, but steered clear from 
suggesting the action was in fact legal. This claim for legitimacy, as opposed to 
solidifying an argument in law, creates a diversion for the public. President Bush claimed 
legitimacy and credibility, without legal foundation. It is imperative to note because it 
                                                          
15
 Ibid 8 
16
 Ibid 8 
17
 Ibid 9 
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conveyed the American perspective towards international law and procedures during 
the Bush Presidency. 
 
In explaining the coalition’s reasons for the intervention, President Bush relied on  
Paragraph six of the resolution which called on the member states to contribute to the 
effort of humanitarian relief efforts, and emphasized, “I want to underscore that all we 
are doing is motivated by humanitarian concerns”18. 
 
Wheeler also mentions Skinner’s perspective on norm creation, whereby states try to 
create normative ideals or actions by legitimizing their actions, and conveying to the 
global community that the actions are not deviations. President Bush claiming the Iraqi 
intervention as legitimate and responsible, he was sending a clear message to the global 
community – ‘this was expected of us’ and ‘this was the responsible course of action to 
take’.  
 
SC Resolution 794 on Somalia: 
The next step towards the creation of a humanitarian intervention norm, according to 
Wheeler, was the conflict in Somalia. On December 3rd, 1992 the UNSC voted 
unanimously for Resolution 794 that authorized member states to use force to regain 
                                                          
18
 Ibid 8 
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stability in the state since it had been facing turmoil due to starvation and rampant 
terrorism. In this case, there is a consensus among scholars that the concerns of the 
UNSC were based completely on humanitarian considerations especially since 
Resolution 794 was passed unanimously. With no functioning government, and its 
people in crisis, the UNSC authorized member states to intervene. As historic as this 
was, there were words used like “unique” and “exceptional” during this process that 
conveyed a hesitance, for fear that this action would create a new norm, perhaps. The 
UNSC did vote unanimously to support Resolution 794, but states needed to explain 
their decisions. By making statements conveying the severity and uniqueness of the 
situation in Somalia, states are sending a message: intervention is not to be expected. 
However, there is evidence that counters the latter, “the emerging norm to protect 
civilians from the collapse of legitimate institutions was further reinforced by the 
international interventions in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Haiti”19. States serve their 
interests, but being a part of a larger international community connotates responsibility, 
and this is evident when the international community once again intervened in the 
Balkans and Haiti.   
 
Rwandan Inaction: 
In 1994, almost one million people were massacred in Rwanda while the world stood 
idly by. The Hutu tribes systematically killed their fellow countrymen, the Tutsis. This 
                                                          
19
 Ibid 8  
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genocide occurred over the course of three months, and the international community 
failed to act even though they were aware of the situation. The failure to protect the 
people of Rwanda has reinforced the idea of intervention, and ‘sovereignty as 
responsibility’20. Sovereignty as responsibility suggests that states may retain authority 
and sovereignty only as long as they do not grossly abuse their positions and people.  
The guilt carried by the international community conveys that a norm may truly have 
been established; due to the lack of intervention, many people died. That inaction has 
still not been forgotten. Countries are entrusted to protect their citizens, but should 
they abuse that privilege than the concept of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ comes into 
play. If a state cannot protect its people, from a foreign or internal source of conflict, 
then the international community may take action and infringe upon a state’s 
sovereignty.  
 
Responsibility to Protect: 
In September 2000, the Canadian government formed The International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) to address the question of intervention. The 
commission discussed political, legal, moral, and operational concerns and issued a 
report in 2001 dubbed The Responsibility to Protect (herein after referred to as R2P).  
 
                                                          
20
 Ibid 8 
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The term R2P did not gain momentum until The United Nations General Assembly 
(UNGA) World Summit in 2005. The Responsibility to Protect concept has garnered 
considerable support and criticism. It is imperative to recognize that although the 
concept of R2P is based on the ICISS report, modifications have been made, and some of 
the stronger language has been removed21. To discuss R2P, it is imperative to 
understand the ‘Three Pillars’ that Secretary General Ban Ki Moon authored: 
 
“- Pillar One stresses that States have the primary responsibility to protect their 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity. 
- Pillar Two addresses the commitment of the international community to 
provide assistance to States in building capacity to protect their populations 
from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to 
assisting those which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out. 
- Pillar Three focuses on the responsibility of international community to take 
timely and decisive action to prevent and halt genocide, ethnic cleansing, war 
crimes and crimes against humanity when a State is manifestly failing to protect 
its populations.22” 
 
                                                          
21
 The concept of sovereignty as responsibility is among the ‘Core Principles’ stated in the ICISS report, but 
that idea is not reflected in Ban Ki-Moon’s Three Pillars. It is an idea that is less ‘popular’, even an 
implication of a loss of sovereignty causes controversy  
22
 Ki-Moon, Ban. “Report of the Secretary General: Implementing The Responsibility to Protect” 
International Coalition for The Responsibility to Protect 12 January 2009  
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There is no new language or requirement. R2P calls for action when systematic and 
gross violation of human rights and international, including ethnic cleansing, war crimes, 
genocide, and crimes against humanity. R2P reaffirms the belief that states have a 
responsibility to act when atrocities are occurring, but legislation such as the Genocide 
Convention already encompasses that language.  
 
Not surprisingly, many theorists such as Ernie Regehr23 have claimed that R2P is a 
concept that has yet to be fully developed; as a new concept, caution is required24. The 
urgency that states in need experience surpasses the inexperienced UNSC in matters of 
intervention and authorization. The genocide in Rwanda occurred over the course of 
approximately 100 days, and although no action was taken, one should consider how 
many people had already lost their lives had the decision to intervene not occurred till 
50 days later. Simply put, the development of the process of intervention (and 
implementation of R2P) is not able to respond in a timely or consistent25 fashion, yet. 
Regehr asserts that the Libyan intervention is a reflection of the implementation of R2P 
since the decision was not dismissed due to a veto vote by any of the P526. In addition, 
given Western economic hegemony, many states may agree with the R2P concept 
                                                          
23
 Research Fellow at the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies 
24
 Regehr, Ernie. “Are R2P Interventions as Inconsistent as the Critics charge?” Disarming Conflict, 21 April 
2010 
25
 Why was R2P not sited in arguing for interventions in Syria or Bahrain? Application is questionable in 
both Libya and Kenya (as you will see below) and it conveys a fault in terms of consistency.  
26
 The ICISS report called upon the P5 not to use their veto power when discussing intervention 
operations; the report calls upon those states to abstain  
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simply out of fear or interest. In fact, many state that the concept of humanitarian 
intervention in general is a product of Western hegemony and possibly even coercion27. 
 
R2P calls for a responsibility to prevent, a responsibility to react, and a responsibility to 
rebuild. These concepts each contain a tremendous amount of action; by prevention the 
R2P could mean exhausting peaceful negotiations, sending aid, providing education or 
attempt to halt any crisis that is about to occur. As for the responsibility to react, that 
implies unconditional, yet proportional action, but a possibility of success is paramount 
also. In terms of the responsibility to rebuild, that implies a long-term relationship 
including financial assistance and training; it conveys a responsibility towards nation 
building. All of these responsibilities encompass a great commitment, and this may in 
fact deter states from intervening in times of crisis.   
On the other hand, it does provide a more realistic picture of what a tremendous 
commitment humanitarian intervention is. Furthermore, R2P calls on the Permanent 5 
of the UNSC to not use their veto power, so who should decide if the UNSC cannot? The 
following actions were recommended by R2P if the UNSC could not agree: 
I. “Consideration of the matter by the General Assembly in Emergency 
Special Session under the "Uniting for Peace28" procedure; and 
                                                          
27
 Ibid 8   
28
 “Resolves that if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to 
exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in any case 
where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General 
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II. Action within area of jurisdiction by regional or sub-regional 
organizations under Chapter VIII of the Charter, subject to their seeking 
subsequent authorization from the Security Council.  
 
B. The Security Council should take into account in all its deliberations that, if it fails 
to discharge its responsibility to protect in conscience-shocking situations crying 
out for action, concerned states may not rule out other means to meet the 
gravity and urgency of that situation - and that the stature and credibility of the 
United Nations may suffer thereby.” 
The above measures indicate alternate options to impose intervention actions, but they 
are extreme actions; any course of action by the GA must still have the support of at 
least one P5 member according to the Uniting for Peace resolution. Therefore, the 
power remains with the P529.    
One situation where the concept of R2P has come into practice is the 2007 Kenyan 
elections. Kenya devolved into chaos following a very divisive election in 2007. In 
response to the urgency of the situation, the African Union appointed a mediation team 
led by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan to quell the riots and the divisiveness of the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to 
Members for collective measures, including in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression the 
use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security. If not in 
session at the time, the General Assembly may meet in emergency special session within twenty-four 
hours of the request therefore. Such emergency special session shall be called if requested by the Security 
Council on the vote of any seven members, or by a majority of the Members of the United Nations” - 
Many have argued that Western hegemony plays a large role in this scenario since hegemonic states can 
control or influence GA members to vote according to their wishes.  
29
 Tomuschat, Christian. “Uniting for Peace”. UN Audiovisual Library of International Law. 2001. 
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people of Kenya. After investigating the situation for more than a month, Annan’s 
mediation team proposed a government based on power sharing among the leading 
parties.  
 
Although the term was not publicly stated when the crisis in Kenya was ongoing, many 
hail that this was an application of R2P. R2P, as a term, has failed in application, possibly 
for fear of implying a loss of sovereignty. It has not become a universal term, and it is 
unknown to many. The concept of ‘Genocide’ for example, is a universal one – R2P is yet 
to gain that status. However, one must take into consideration that the term R2P gained 
international traction at the World Summit in 2005, and Lemkin wrote the Genocide 
convention over sixty years ago.   
 
 
Evaluation of Emergent Norms Regarding Humanitarian Intervention 
The following paragraphs will include an analysis of the status of multilateral 
humanitarian intervention as an emergent norm in international law, examining both 
the supportive and counter arguments.  
 
Supportive Arguments:   
 24 
Humanitarian intervention as a concept, and as a norm, has gained traction according to 
Stromseth and Wheeler. Intervention has become more common however, and the 
global interdependency that globalization has given us has made us more concerned 
about other countries.30 Wheeler also suggests that intervention is occurring more often 
on purely humanitarian grounds, which is somewhat speculative – many would state 
that it is self-interest that motivates countries. Buchanan and realist theorists would 
disagree; Iraq has oil and is too close to other major oil providers, Somalia is a haven for 
terrorists and is strategically placed in terms of geopolitics and trade, the Balkans are 
situated too close to the Western hegemons, and Libya provides a significant amount of 
European oil. No matter the motivations behind intervention, it occurs more often, and 
it is starting to appear more and more “normal” in terms of international relations.   
 
Although scholars like Wheeler suggest the increasing occurrence and acceptance of 
humanitarian intervention in the international community, there are still many legal 
questions that arise in these discussions. Legal scholars like Burton and Brown have 
tried to gain insight into intervention by reviewing the concept of unilateral 
intervention.  
 
Although Burton’s law review concerning unilateral humanitarian intervention occurred 
before the intervention in Kosovo, his arguments still add to the debate about codifying 
                                                          
30
 I.e. if Saudi Arabia decreases oil production, the global oil market suffers 
 25 
the process of humanitarian intervention. Burton agrees that Kosovo provided a 
precedent for an excusable breach, but what Burton discusses under the guidance of his 
Professor, Jane Stromseth, is the multiple obstacles states’ face when contemplating 
intervention.  The United Nations Security Council’s veto power has left many states 
that are willing to take action in fear of violating international law even when atrocities 
are obviously occurring.  
 
Burton calls the current approach to taking the course of intervention “sub-legal”31 
rendering willful countries powerless, and granting the power of authority to five 
countries that are permanently in their positions. Burton suggests that a General 
Assembly resolution would allow codification of unilateral intervention. Although 
unilateral interventions have been discouraged in the international community, the 
suggestion for a GA resolution is not unwarranted. It exposes the decision making 
process to all members of the United Nations. Although many speculate that the GA is 
largely a symbolic body, there is no reason why the UN cannot empower the assembly. 
The empowerment of the GA could lead to a greater distribution of the decision making 
process, and potentially allow for more consistent rulings on intervention 
considerations. For example, the Uniting for Peace resolution could be the new 
authorization process. 
                                                          
31
 Michael Burton, “Legalizing the Sublegal: A Proposal for Codifying a Doctrine of Unilateral Humanitarian 
Intervention” Georgetown Law Journal, December 1996, 85 Geo. L.J. 417 & Stromseth, Jane, “Rethinking 
Humanitarian Intervention”, Cambridge University Press 2003, p.244-252 
 26 
 
Considering Michael Levitin's "Liberation of Paris Principle," which measures the 
legitimacy of intervention by the reaction of the liberated, one begins to question the 
intent behind Burton’s arguments. Levitin, "If the people throw flowers, the invasion is 
lawful; if they do not throw flowers, or if they throw anything else, the invasion is 
unlawful." Presumably, those otherwise facing mass execution would "throw flowers." 
Arguing the legitimacy of an intervention by these means appears inane. It is an 
arbitrary judgment, and an inaccurate measurement, and Burton knows this “While 
these measures are of primarily symbolic value, they may nonetheless prove politically 
expedient by helping to assuage concerns that yet another chink has been made in the 
rusting armor of state sovereignty” therefore it is somewhat confusing why he included 
this argument at all. Burton is attempting to make a case to codify unilateral 
humanitarian intervention, only arguments that can further his purpose should be 
included, especially when he stated earlier “consent of the people may be presumed in 
cases where thousands of people face extermination”32. Burton’s suggestion to 
empower the GA however appears to have two dimensions: symbolism and granting 
wider authority. The P5 of the UNSC have ultimate decision-making control, and with 
both China and Russia generally opposed to sovereignty infringement, states are 
sometimes rendered powerless. 
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Criticisms and Counter Arguments  
As one may observe, there are many differences with regard to humanitarian 
intervention in terms of authorization and implementation. Buchanan and the realist 
theorists do present compelling arguments, and they do convey the hesitancy towards 
establishing humanitarian intervention as a norm but they do not account for the 
popularity of R2P and other developments such as the excusable breach clause. 
Buchanan’s argument of ‘right’ vs. ‘duty’ however is the most compelling, and it does 
pose a legitimate concern to Wheeler and Stromseth’s arguments. 
 
When discussing the Kosovo intervention, scholar Bartram Brown is cautious about the 
concept commonly known as an excusable breach33, “When a vague doctrine can be 
invoked by states to justify the use of force, it offers them a license that is subject to 
abuse. This justification for the use of force is inherently threatening to other states, 
particularly when those states claiming this license are the most powerful states in the 
international community.”34 Powerful states will always be more able to impede upon 
other states, and international laws need to be weary. The UN charter allows the use of 
force in only two cases, self-defense and authorized action by the UNSC. However, given 
the precedent set by Kosovo, the UN’s stipulations become less significant. Brown is also 
cautious to remind the reader not to disclude the motivation of self-interest in the 
application of intervention.  
                                                          
33
 Which is argued by Stromseth 
34
 Brown, Bartram. Humanitarian Intervention and Kosovo: Humanitarian Intervention at a Crossroads, 
William & Mary Law Review, May 2000 
 28 
 
Some scholars however, are more aggressive in regards to the implementation of 
humanitarian intervention. Ignatieff suggests that when intervention is undertaken, the 
countries intervened upon should become “protectorates”35 of the states that assisted 
them. One may easily claim that this is a return to colonization. The idea is highly 
controversial because colonization is a reflection of recent history. Hong Kong only 
became independent from British control in 1997. However, Ignatieff is not alone in this 
opinion. Keohane suggests a similar course, whereby a state, after it has been 
intervened upon, should not regain total sovereignty – the intervening powers should 
be a partner authority in the state until stability and credibility are established.  
 
Determining the status of humanitarian intervention is based on perception and one’s 
analysis, but this thesis regards multi-lateral humanitarian intervention as an emerging 
norm in international law and international society. 
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Chapter 3: Country Profiles 
 
In order to further study the decision-making process for the course of humanitarian 
intervention, three case studies will be examined. The cases of Kosovo, Somalia, and Libya will 
be the foundation for the adaptive guideline this thesis will later introduce. These brief 
introductions will introduce the situations that led to external forces intervening; the purpose of 
this thesis is not to address the outcome or end result of the intervention, but only the decision 
to intervene. 
 
Somalia: 
 
Somalia is a state only in name; lacking a credible government, and with its people suffering 
tremendously to this day, Somalia suffers from a lack of leadership and stability. On December 
3rd, 1992 the UNSC voted unanimously for Resolution 794 that authorized member states “to 
use all necessary means to establish… a secure environment for humanitarian relief 
operations”36. The concerns of the UNSC were based completely on humanitarian 
considerations. With no functioning government, and a people in crisis, the UNSC authorized 
member states to intervene. As historic as this was, there were words used like “unique” and 
“exceptional” in resolutions that conveyed a hesitance, for fear that this action would perhaps 
create a new norm37. 
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“Somalia was a real turning point… Somalia made people realize that when human rights 
reached a certain level, some kind of intervention was inevitable. There was an outcry among 
informed elites - people who knew what was going on- to do something”38. Before the 
intervention began, Somalia was already in crisis; severe drought, hunger, civil war and a mass 
refugee exodus into neighboring countries39. The intervention however, was not designed to 
solve every issue facing the Somali population, but rather to function in the capacity to assist 
NGOs with logistics and supplies by escorting convoys. Moreover, the intervening forces would 
construct and repair roads, dig wells, repair airfields, and open up the ports in Kismayu and 
Mogadishu40. Although the intervening forces wanted to oust General Aideed, the notorious 
warlord who violently opposed the US and UN forces, he was not the focus of the intervention. 
Aideed infamously ordered an attack on Pakistani peacekeepers; 24 peacekeepers lost their lives 
during that attack41. The attack resulted in the US placing a $25,000 bounty on Aideed’s head – 
dead or alive.  The intervention in Somalia was not successful, and although the intentions of 
the intervening forces appeared to be noble, they were not committed to Somalia in the wake 
of high casualties. Aideed even claimed to be President in 1995, after the withdrawal of the 
intervening forces. The attempt to capture Aideed is considered mission creep whereby the 
forces took steps beyond their objectives. The attempt to capture Aideed compromised the 
intervention.    
 
For months in 1993, the American public watched images of starving women and children in 
Somalia so there was a public outcry to take action in Somalia. The media continued fueling the 
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outrage. Many scholars attribute the intervention in Somalia to the constant images of starving 
women and children on the 24- hour news cycle. Colin Powell further fueled the discourse when 
he authored an article for Foreign Affairs justifying an intervention in Somalia. Not only did he 
claim it was just, but that an intervention could be successful. Although Powell, then the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was in support of intervention into Somalia, he was 
adamant about keeping the number of casualties low. Politically, high casualties would be 
devastating and possibly reverse political support and public sentiment.  
 
Unfortunately, things would not go according to plan. The situation in Somalia was 
deteriorating, and the need for action was obvious, “By 1992, almost 4.5 million people, more 
than half the total number in the country, were threatened with starvation, severe malnutrition 
and related diseases. The magnitude of suffering was immense. Overall, an estimated 300,000 
people, including many children, died. Some 2 million people, violently displaced from their 
home areas, fled either to neighboring countries or elsewhere within Somalia. All institutions of 
governance and at least 60 per cent of the country's basic infrastructure disintegrated”42.  On 
October 3rd, 1993 US forces entered Aideed’s compound, based on a tip, to capture the General 
consequently overreaching the boundaries of the operation. 18 American soldiers died that day, 
alongside approximately 1000 Somali citizens for a mission that was not directly linked to the 
objective the coalition sought to achieve. The attack on the American soldiers’ helicopter was 
devastating; the soldiers’ bodies were dragged in the street as Aideed supporters reveled in 
their victory. These images shocked the conscious of the American public, and support for the 
Somali mission quickly diminished. Black Hawk Down would be the beginning of the end of the 
US presence in Somalia.  
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Somalia has changed the policy making process in terms of intervention; the US is always 
overcautious in terms of dispatching soldiers, always weary of casualty numbers. Many scholars 
theorize that Somalia is the reason why President Clinton ordered air strikes in the case of the 
former Yugoslavia; air strikes would sustain less American or coalition casualties than a ground 
operation. The latter is disheartening because Somalia was supposed to be an intervention to 
provide aid and logistical support and instead, the mission expanded – and overreached.  
 
Kosovo: 
 
In 1389, at the battle on the Field of Blackbirds, the Turks defeated the Orthodox Christian Serbs 
at the Fields of Blackbirds battle. Consequently, the Ottomans ruled the province, Kosovo, for 
five centuries. For this reason, the Serbian community has always been possessive towards 
Kosovo43. The historical importance of the Kosovo province is considered paramount to the 
maintenance of Serbian historical integrity. The province of Kosovo would also see an explosion 
in the Albanian population and a Serb exodus in the second half of the twentieth century. By the 
1980s, ethnic Albanians, who composed approximately 90% of the population, faced increasing 
oppression from the Serbian government. The Kosovo Serbs began complaining of persecution 
by the Albanian community in the 1980s44, and the Kosovo Serbs received support for this claim, 
“They [Kosovo Serbs] received moral support from the nationalists in the Serbian Academy of 
Sciences and Arts. In an inflammatory public memorandum in 1986, the Serbian intellectuals 
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charged Kosovo Albanians with masterminding ‘the physical, political, legal, and cultural 
genocide of the Serbian population in Kosovo’”45.  
 
Milosevic only exacerbated this divide; in 1989 he stripped Kosovo of its autonomy that was 
granted to it by Marshal Tito46. Milosevic went even further and fired Albanians from their jobs, 
closed their schools, and the Serbian police force was also largely expanded.   
 
The divisive sentiment gave way to the creation of the Kosovo Liberation Army, when Kosovo 
was not discussed at the Dayton Peace Accords, the Kosovo Albanians were determined to take 
charge of their own fate, and thus the KLA was created. Too long sentence The KLA promised to 
protect Kosovo Albanians and win independence for the province47. 
 
As Yugoslavia began to separate, the global community, especially the American government, 
grew more concerned about the fate of Kosovo. President Bush’s “Christmas Warning”48; where 
Secretary of State Eagleburger warned Milosevic that if he were to attack Kosovo, the United 
States would pursue military action. The Christmas Warning is considered the first determining 
factor that would eventually lead to intervention.  
 
President Clinton was hesitant about the use of force in Kosovo; military intervention into 
Kosovo was risky given its attachment to various countries in the region and Clinton feared that 
                                                          
45
 Ibid 43 
46
 Ibid 43 
47
 Ibid 43 
48
 Ibid 43 
 34 
by intervening into Kosovo he would be unleashing a possible regional calamity. Bosnia had no 
such attachments, thus its case was more clear and the decision – easier. With the atrocities 
becoming more frequent, and more public, human rights groups “descended on the region”49 
and the pressure was mounting on Clinton to take action.     
 
Richard Holbrooke attempted to negotiate with Milosevic in October 1998, promising that NATO 
would not pursue airstrikes if he would remove forces from Kosovo, and allow the entrance of 
2000 international verifiers who would not be armed50. Milosevic did not honor his part of the 
agreement; on January 15th, 1999 Serbian forces attacked the town of Racak violently and 
executed forty five Kosovo Albanians. When Ambassador Walker51 arrived on the scene only a 
day later, he found the mutilated bodies of victims, and proclaimed the actions crimes against 
humanity52. The reaction in Washington was that of shock and anger, “She [Madeleine Albright] 
and the rest of the Clinton team remembered Srebrenica, were still coming to grips with guilt 
over the Rwanda genocide, and were looking to make amends”53.  
 
The United States and its allies decided to try negotiations one last time, in February 1999, they 
convened a conference at Rambouillet54 to discuss an ultimatum with Milosevic’s Serbian forces, 
although he did not actually bother to attend. The United States and its allies would bomb the 
Serbian forces if they did not allow 25,000 peacekeepers into Kosovo, grant the Albanians 
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autonomy, and remove most of their troops from Kosovo55. Given the historical significance of 
Kosovo, the Serbs refused to consider the demands. to the Serbians, they did not even consider 
the deal. Supreme allied commander for Europe, General Clark, began bombing Serbian forces 
on March 24th, 1999.   
 
NATO intended for the intervention to stop ethnic cleansing and save the Kosovo Albanians 
from enduring further human rights abuses and atrocities, but the intervention had unintended 
consequences. The Serbian forces rounded up Kosovo Albanians, separated the men from the 
women, often shooting the men and scaring the women into leaving Kosovo. An expulsion of 1.3 
million Kosovo Albanians (estimate) from their homes occurred shortly after the NATO 
intervention began56. This mass exodus captured the attention of the global public; reporters 
flocked to the Kosovo province, Macedonia, and Albania57 to report the horrors of the most 
horrific story of ethnic cleansing in modern times.  
 
Libya:  
 
 Libya achieved independence in 1951.  In 1969 a military coup d’état ensured Colonel 
Muammar Qadhafi’s power grab58. With plentiful oil and natural gas resources, Qadhafi has 
managed to maintain his regime while starving the Libyan public. Qadhafi was oppressive; the 
enforcement of censorship, for example, was so extreme to the point of imprisonment. With the 
rise of the Arab Spring, light has been shed upon the atrocities that have been occurring 
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throughout the Arab world for generations. Younger generations of Arabs from nations suffering 
injustice at the hands of their leaders rose up and made their voices heard, at all costs. Libya 
was no exception. Like many Arab countries, Libya is experiencing a youth bulge; over 60% of 
the population is between the ages 15-6459. The youth bulge across the Arab world, coupled 
with rising unemployment60 and higher living costs, contributes to the youths’ revolt.  
 
Neighboring Tunisia had an outbreak of riots, protests, and outcries as the public suffered 
continued inflation in the cost of food, corruption, and high unemployment rates; with people 
barely being able to afford to feed their families in an oppressive regime, the anger was too 
great to be quelled. It was the beginning of the Arab Spring. The fury over autocratic regimes 
that were abusive towards their people spread throughout the Arab world. Libya and many 
states in the Arab world were inspired by Tunisia’s example, and began to protest Qadhafi’s 
regime. Tunisia successfully ousted their President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in January 2011.  
 
On March 17th, 2011 UN Resolution 1973 was passed. The resolution authorized the imposition 
of a no-fly zone and enacted Chapter VII of the UN charter to authorize a multi-lateral 
intervention by NATO into Libya, “Since March 24, an unprecedented coalition of NATO Allies 
and non-NATO contributors having been protecting civilians under threat of attack in Libya, 
enforcing an arms embargo and maintaining a no-fly zone. As NATO Secretary General 
Rasmussen explained, under ''Operation Unified Protector,'' NATO is doing ''nothing more, 
nothing less'' than meeting its mandates under United Nations Security Council resolutions. No 
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NATO ground troops have participated in the operation – NATO’s success to date has been 
achieved solely with air and sea assets”61.  
 
There was criticism directed towards the United States for not being decisive enough, even 
though they eventually did take action by being one of the states leading the charge towards 
authorization of intervention into Libya. The US was careful not to appear as the ‘international 
policeman’, President Obama and his cabinet wanted an internationally approved coalition to 
take action. Consequently, the intervention would be perceived as a benevolent action that was 
based upon humanitarian considerations, and it would not be a US action but rather an action 
taken up by the NATO coalition. Qadhafi was using military force against his people, and a 
humanitarian crisis needed to be averted – but not by the global hegemon. The UNSC approval 
coupled with NATO’s willingness gave the mission more international legitimacy.  
 
Libyan resistance forces created the National Transitional Council to ensure a more smooth 
transition. As NATO and Libyan forces began to take territory, the NTC took control over 
municipal actions and attempted to ensure the safety and control of the Libyan people, 
specifically supporting the resistance movement by meeting with international diplomatic 
personnel or securing Libya’s overseas resources. The NTC is assuming the governmental role 
during this intervention. On July 15th, 2011 the United States recognized the NTC as Libya’s 
“legitimate government”. Other countries have also formally recognized, and legitimized, the 
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NTC; Britain, the African Union, France, and even China62 have declared support for the NTC.  
China was the last Permanent 5 member to recognize the NTC.  
 
With the capture and killing of Qadhafi on October 20, 2011, the NTC seemed to officially 
become the one loud voice of the people. Although Libya is rife with tribal divisions, the NTC has 
become the internationally recognized representation of the Libyan people. What will become 
of Libya is unknown, but the humanitarian intervention most certainly ended a tyrannical 
dictator’s rule in six months.   
 
Intervention Decisions: 
 
What these three case studies (Somalia, Kosovo and Libya) collectively conveyed is a potential 
for violent escalations. If interventions did not occur, there is evidence in all three cases that 
suggests that atrocities would have occurred – and continued to occur if coalitions did not 
intervene. In Somalia, the situation was so dire that there was not even a legitimate, formal 
government established. Warlords, clan leaders, and domestic terrorists had control over a 
country, which they starved to gain power. Kosovo was experiencing ethnic cleansing, and 
without intervention, a whole people – the Kosovar Albanians, were in danger. As for Libya, 
Qadhafi was using his military force and vast resources against his own people because they 
were protesting his corruption. In all three states, disappearances, torture, and corruption were 
commonplace. More alarming however, is that these regimes violently attacked their people. 
The intention for this thesis is not to examine the success or failure of multi-lateral humanitarian 
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interventions, but to examine how a coalition of states decides to take action and intervene 
based on humanitarian grounds.   
 
The following methodology section will begin to examine how states make the decision to 
intervene by cataloging recent cases of intervention with the aid of a historical table that will 
convey the decision making process, including the moral and political justifications and criticisms 
of interventions in Somalia, Kosovo and Libya.   
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Chapter 4: Methodology 
 
In order to establish an adaptive guideline that assists states in making the decision to 
intervene, one must look at the past for reference. This historical table (Table 1) will convey the 
process and historical framework of the decisions made by various parties to intervene in 
Somalia, Kosovo, and Libya. By examining the intervening forces’ verbal communication and the 
language contained in the legislative framework, this Table summarizes justifications on which 
the interventions rested. 
 
Understanding the decision-making and implementation processes of these interventions 
provides a greater in-depth analysis of the political and moral considerations made when states 
decided to intervene. The nature by which the interventions were decided upon and 
implemented enables an enhanced view of the three case studies. Exemplified in the framework 
below concerning the Somali intervention, the states’ reasons for entering the country allowed 
for a rare unanimous vote. The severity of the hunger crises coupled with armed clan leaders 
was evident in the language used in legal documents and speeches, as Table 1 will show. A 
global consensus existed that this was unquestionably a ‘humanitarian’ intervention. Many 
scholars, specifically from the realist school of thought, do not subscribe of benevolent 
intervention, but when so many countries from multiple regions state purely humanitarian 
reasons for action, a universal consensus grows and becomes accepted. Somalia’s people were 
starving, terrorism was rampant, and no stable government existed. It was a state only in name, 
 41 
and the international community took collective action to alleviate the suffering of the Somali 
public.  
 
This table also analyzes three case studies to gain historical context for the decisions that led to 
intervention. The exact language from the legislation and speeches are quoted in order to 
convey the thought process behind the international community and political leaders that made 
the decision to intervene. This thesis will use this table and historical insight to create an 
adaptive guideline whereby coalitions may consider a multitude of factors that can assist them 
in making the decision to intervene, or whether to take another course of action. Furthermore, 
decisions by international courts, international legal bodies, and international organizations63 
will be utilized to assess the decision making process taken in the three case studies 
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Somalia
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Kosovo
65
 
 
 
Libya
66
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  Legal Documents’ Justifications 
for Humanitarian Intervention 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UNSC Resolution 794, passed 
unanimously on December 3
rd
, 
1992: 
 “The magnitude of the 
human tragedy caused by 
the conflict in Somalia, 
further exacerbated by 
the obstacles being 
created to the 
distribution of 
humanitarian assistance, 
constitutes a threat to 
international peace and 
security” 
 “Expressing grave alarm 
at continuing reports of 
widespread violations of 
international 
humanitarian law 
occurring in Somalia, 
including reports of 
violence and threats of 
violence against 
personnel participating 
lawfully in impartial 
humanitarian relief 
activities; deliberate 
attacks on non-
combatants, relief 
consignments and 
vehicles, and medical and 
relief facilities; and 
impeding the delivery of 
 
Rambouillet ultimatum in February 
1999; the United States and its 
European Allies told Milosevic’s 
forces that if they did not abandon 
their ethnic cleansing campaign in 
Kosovo, return autonomy to the 
Kosovo Albanians, and allow the 
entrance of peacekeepers into 
Kosovo, they would bomb Serbian 
forces. The Serbs did not even 
entertain the offer.  
 
March 24
rd
, 1999 Secretary General 
of NATO, Javier Solana, and Supreme 
Allied Commander General Clark, 
ordered an air strike over the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia – without 
UNSC authorization 
 The NATO air strike was 
called “Operation Allied 
Force”, but the United States 
called it “Operation Noble 
Anvil” 
 Air strikes started March 
24
th
, 1999 and ended on 
June 11
th
, 1999 
NATO’s reasoning for intervening, 
Meeting held April 12, 1999: 
 
UNSC Resolution 1973, passed 
March 17, 2011: 
 “Condemning the gross 
and systematic violation 
of human rights, including 
arbitrary detentions, 
enforced disappearances, 
torture and summary 
executions” 
 “Further condemning acts 
of violence and 
intimidation committed by 
the Libyan authorities 
against journalists, media 
professionals and 
associated personnel” 
 “Considering that the 
widespread and 
systematic attacks 
currently taking place in 
the Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya against the 
civilian population may 
amount to crimes against 
humanity” 
 “Expressing its 
determination to ensure 
the protection of civilians 
and civilian populated 
areas and the rapid and 
unimpeded passage of 
humanitarian assistance 
and the safety of 
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food and medical 
supplies essential for the 
survival of the civilian 
population” 
 “Demand that all parties, 
movements and factions 
in Somalia immediately 
cease hostilities, 
maintain a cease-fire 
throughout the country, 
and cooperate with the 
Special Representative of 
the Secretary-General as 
well as with the military 
forces to be established 
pursuant to the 
authorization given in 
paragraph 10 below in 
order to promote the 
process of relief 
distribution, 
reconciliation and 
political settlement in 
Somalia” 
  “Verifiable stop to all 
military action and the 
immediate ending of 
violence and repression” 
 “Withdrawal from Kosovo of 
the military, police and 
paramilitary forces” 
 “The unconditional and safe 
return of all refugees and 
displaced persons and 
unhindered access to them 
by humanitarian aid 
organizations” 
 “The establishment of a 
political framework 
agreement for Kosovo on 
the basis of the Rambouillet 
Accords, in conformity with 
international law and the 
Charter of the United 
Nation” 
 
UNSC Resolution 1244, adopted June 
10
th
, 1999: 
 “Determined to resolve the 
grave humanitarian situation 
in Kosovo, Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia, and to provide 
for the safe and free return 
of all refugees and displaced 
persons to their home” 
 “Demands in particular that 
the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia put an immediate 
and verifiable end to 
violence and repression in 
Kosovo, and begin and 
complete verifiable phased 
withdrawal from Kosovo of 
all military, police and 
paramilitary forces according 
to a rapid timetable” 
 “Demilitarizing the Kosovo 
Liberation Army (KLA) and 
other armed Kosovo 
Albanian groups as required” 
 “Ensuring the protection and 
freedom of movement of 
itself, the international civil 
presence, and other 
humanitarian personnel” 
 “call for the imposition of 
a no-fly zone on Libyan 
military aviation, and to 
establish safe areas in 
places exposed to shelling 
as a precautionary 
measure that allows the 
protection of the Libyan 
people and foreign 
nationals” 
 “Deploring the continuing 
use of mercenaries by the 
Libyan authorities” 
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international organizations” 
 Establishing a civil 
international presence 
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Presidents’ or Coalition Leaders’ 
Justifications for Humanitarian 
Intervention [Declarations of 
Action / Speeches] 
 
 
President HW Bush’s Speech from 
Oval Office, December 4, 1992: 
 “1.5 million people could 
starve to death”; there is 
no access to food and in 
order to prevent tragedy, 
the US needs to step in 
 “Anarchy prevails”; there 
is no stable government 
and the gangs have 
overtaken the street, 
troops need to provide 
security in order to 
ensure the safe delivery 
of food to starving 
Somalis – “Get the food 
through” 
 “America will answer the 
call” to assist the 
suffering people of 
Somalia 
 “They [US troops] will 
succeed” in aiding these 
people with the 
assistance of other 
nations’ forces 
 “We must give them 
hope”, American action is 
often necessary given its 
global reach 
 Create a secure 
environment and hand 
over the mission to the 
UN: 
-Open supply routes 
-Get the food moving 
-Prepare UN forces to 
keep it (food) moving 
 Will not tolerate gangs or 
armed attacks, but 
emphasizes the mission is 
“humanitarian” 
 Respect sovereignty and 
independence, goal is 
purely “to enable the 
starving to be fed” 
 
President Clinton’s Speech from the 
Oval Office, March 24
th
, 1999: 
 Protect people from 
inhuman treatment, 
execution, exodus 
 Protect the vital interests of 
the US; proximity to Europe 
 Did not want to see the 
region explode yet again and 
repeat the history of WW1 
and WW2 
 Wanted to regain autonomy 
for Kosovars so that they 
may be able to practice their 
culture and religions in 
peace 
 Kosovars are willing to come 
to the table but the Serbians 
refuse to do so 
 Serbia preparing major 
offensive against the 
Kosovars 
 US & NATO has “Moral 
imperative” to end this 
tragedy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
President Obama’s Speech from 
East Room of White House, March 
17, 2011: 
 Protesters met with 
brutality and violence; this 
is not acceptable 
 Innocent civilians were 
killed, hospitals were 
attacked, and peaceful 
protests disavowed 
(paraphrase) 
 “ALL attacks against 
civilians MUST stop” 
 “Need to stop their 
campaign of repression, 
Qadhafi chose to ignore 
his people – and launched 
a military campaign 
against his people” 
 “We will have no mercy 
and no pity” – quoting 
Qadhafi stating that 
current Libyan leadership 
would commit 
humanitarian atrocities 
 Establish a no-fly zone 
 “Focus is clear: protect”  
 Stressed strong ties with 
Arab League and UN in 
denouncing Qadhafi; 
NATO coalition action, not 
US intervention  
 States that Qadhafi has an 
opportunity to step down, 
if not, military action will 
take place 
 “Potential for mass 
murder” if the situation is 
not addressed 
 Reaffirms that US has no 
intention of determining 
the fate of Libya; it is in 
the hands of the Libyan 
people 
 “The United States of 
America will not stand idly 
by in the face of actions 
that undermine global 
peace”  
 “Our cause is just” 
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Common Justifications between 
Leaders’ Justifications and the 
Legal Documents’ Justifications 
 
 
 Humanitarian obligation 
to assist the starving 
population in Somalia  
 Grant starving people 
access to food 
 Call for an end to the 
hostile, violent activities 
that endanger the Somali 
population  
 Demanding an end to 
violence, war crimes, and 
human rights atrocities 
 Regaining the autonomous 
position of Kosovo 
 Removal of Serbian forces 
from the province 
 Qadhafi’s violence 
towards his people  
 People have a right to 
protest peacefully  
 Civilian attacks and 
vulnerability are 
unjustified and acceptable 
 Potential for escalation  
 
 
States that opposed and 
supported the decision to 
intervene 
 Opposed: No states 
 Supported: Unanimous 
decision by UNSC to 
intervene 
 Opposed: Russia, China, and 
India  
 Supported: France, UK, US, 
Slovenia, Argentina, Brazil, 
Bahrain, Malaysia, Gabon, 
Namibia, and NATO 
 Opposed: (by abstention) 
Brazil, China, Germany, 
India, Russian Federation 
 Supported: Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Colombia, 
Lebanon, Portugal, South 
Africa, Gabon, France, US, 
UK, Qatar & NATO  
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Parties that led the interventions  United Nations and 
various international 
forces including US, 
Australia, Italy, Canada, 
Botswana, Kuwait, 
Morocco, New Zealand, 
Nigeria, Norway, 
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, 
Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, 
United Arab Emirates, 
United Kingdom and 
Zimbabwe 
 
 NATO forces led, 
coordinated, and carried out 
the Kosovo intervention 
without UNSC approval – or 
condemnation  
 NATO forces in coalition 
with other armed forces 
including Qatar, Jordan, 
UAE, and Sweden 
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Critics’ Main Counter Arguments 
 
 The images constantly 
streaming in the media of 
hungry children caused 
the intervention, not a 
complete analysis of the 
situation; interventions, if 
taken as a course of 
action, should have a 
chance of success – a 
better study of the 
situation would convey 
that was not possible at 
that time 
 NATO Allies were motivated 
by the proximity to Western 
Europe 
 Ignatieff suggests that the 
intervention in Kosovo was 
so that American forces 
could convey dominance 
over NATO 
 The intervening forces came 
to the aid of fellow “whites” 
 Sets a dangerous precedent, 
that UNSC authorization is 
not required, and 
circumventing it does not 
make one liable for penalties 
 Too many civilian casualties 
occurred 
 A significant amount of 
Europe’s oil is imported 
from Libya, therefore the 
economic interest serves 
as an encouraging factor 
to act 
 Why intervene in the case 
of Libya and not other 
Arab countries suffering 
from similar brutal, 
autocratic regimes like 
Bahrain or Syria 
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Chapter 5: Guidelines  
 
The preceding section analyzed the decision-making and implementation processes of 
intervention in three recent cases of intervention.  Relying on this information, and working 
from existing principles of humanitarian law and laws of armed conflict, this chapter seeks to 
introduce guidelines that may assist states when considering intervention. The codification of 
the decision making process can begin when guidelines are set.  
 
The following section will highlight four suggested considerations for coalitions to factor in when 
contemplating humanitarian intervention as a course of action. These suggested guidelines are 
only a step towards the codification of the decision-making process, and need to be expanded in 
order to encompass the diversity of the situations that can warrant intervention. International 
law has sought to protect states and their sovereignty, but these guidelines will convey the 
support of international laws and precedents that uphold states’ rights to intervene. 
 
 
When the situation is classified as a non-international armed conflict:  
In the cases of Somalia and Libya, the situations that caused the angst that lead to international 
forces to intervene were internal. However, there is criterion set by international law that 
determines whether a case is truly considered to be a “non-international armed conflict” as 
defined by the Geneva Conventions. As history has demonstrated, whether and at what point a 
conflict is strictly internal is often difficult to pinpoint as one can observe in the analysis below.  
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According to Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention, non-international armed conflicts are 
defined as conflicts that occurring within states. Generally, one party is the government, and the 
opposing party is nongovernmental in nature67. This definition is vague, but Common Article 3 
does exclude riots and intermittent acts of violence from the scope of armed conflict68. A 
situation must meet two variables to meet the criteria as a non-international armed conflict69: 
 
“A. First, the hostilities must reach a minimum level of intensity. This may be the 
case, for example, when the hostilities are of a collective character or when the 
government is obliged to use military force against the insurgents, instead of 
mere police forces 
B. Second, non-governmental groups involved in the conflict must be considered as 
‘parties to the conflict’, meaning that they possess organized armed forces. This means 
for example that their forces have to under a certain command structure and have the 
capacity to sustain military operations”70. 
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 ICRC, “How is the term “Armed Conflict” defined in international humanitarian law”, Opinion Paper, 
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 51 
Although this allows us an opportunity to classify what is occurring in Libya as a non-
international armed conflict, but does Kosovo fit this criterion since Yugoslavia was in the midst 
of dissolution? Should one consider Kosovo an autonomous state? After all, Kosovo only 
officially declared independence in 2008. Yugoslavia was fracturing, but not yet dissolved. Also, 
Somalia was and continues to suffer from clan violence and home-grown terrorism, but given 
that there is virtually no government in Somalia –can one say that Somalia meets the criteria for 
non-international conflict? In the Geneva Convention, Common Article 3 assumes that one of 
the parties involved in the conflict is the government. However, one must note that although 
the Geneva Conventions apply to contracting parties, the conventions have reached such a level 
of universality that they are considered customary law71. 
 
The adoption of a narrower definition of non-international conflicts to incite Additional Protocol 
II of the Geneva Conventions72 allowed for greater clarity in terms of determining the status of a 
conflict. Protocol II73 applies to conflicts “which take place in the territory of a High Contracting 
Party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups 
which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to 
enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this 
Protocol”. This definition incites two new factors: that the opposition group must have control 
over territory, and the conflict must be between government forces vs. non-governmental 
forces, not between two non-governmental forces. This restriction does not disqualify Article 3’s 
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definition, but rather narrows the scope whereby Protocol II may be utilized. This applies in the 
case of Libya.   
 
The International Committee of the Red Cross suggests a more rounded definition of non-
international conflict to encompass most non-international conflicts,  
 
“Non-international armed conflicts are protracted armed confrontations occurring 
between governmental armed forces and the forces of one or more armed groups, or 
between such groups arising on the territory of a State [party to the Geneva 
Conventions]. The armed confrontation must reach a minimum level of intensity and the 
parties involved in the conflict must show a minimum of organization”. 
 
The ICRC definition grants a lawmaker or government official more room to make a decision 
concerning proceeding with a humanitarian intervention in the case of a non-international 
conflict that threatens the civilian population.  
 
Within the body of Protocol II, the text is very clear that the use of Protocol II cannot be used as 
grounds for justification of interventions:  
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“Art 3. Non-intervention: 
1. Nothing in this Protocol shall be invoked for the purpose of affecting the sovereignty 
of a State or the responsibility of the government, by all legitimate means, to maintain 
or re-establish law and order in the State or to defend the national unity and territorial 
integrity of the State. 
 
2. Nothing in this Protocol shall be invoked as a justification for intervening, directly or 
indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the armed conflict or in the internal or external 
affairs of the High Contracting Party in the territory of which that conflict occurs.” 
 
Humanitarian intervention cannot use an incident where a state meets the criteria for Protocol 
II as a reason or justification for the infringement of sovereignty, even when the application of 
the protocol makes evident that armed conflict is occurring, and the public is in danger. There is 
no such limitation however, in Article 3. Therefore, one may draw on Article 3 as justification for 
humanitarian intervention. However, it is imperative to note that states could be more likely to 
take action if a governmental authority is being abusive since governments are usually well 
armed and have control over territory and military forces.  
 
These complexities make it difficult to navigate international humanitarian law, but a line must 
be drawn. Therefore, for the sake of this study, Libya, Somalia, and Kosovo will all be considered 
as non-international armed conflicts whereby international forces took action to stop internal 
strife. Libya because Qadhafi used his military against internal rebel forces, Somalia because the 
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clan warfare, strife, and terrorism was home grown, and Kosovo because it did not formally 
announce independence till 2008.  
Libya’s National Transitional Council is armed and resisting the Libyan loyalists and Qadhafi 
forces. Armed clan leaders and terrorists threatened Somalia, and Kosovo’s KLA was armed and 
fighting Serbian forces. Therefore, this analysis finds this internal armed conflict as a credible 
justification for intervention.  
 
Furthermore, this guideline strives for intervention with regards to non-international armed 
conflicts because there are many more treaties and international laws that address international 
armed conflicts,  
 
“This wealth of treaty law [international armed conflicts] does not regulate a large 
proportion of today’s armed conflicts in sufficient detail. The primary reason for this is 
that the majority of current armed conflicts are non-international, which are subject to 
far fewer treaty rules than international conflicts, although their number is increasing. In 
fact, only a limited number of treaties apply to non-international armed conflicts, 
namely the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, as amended, the Statute of 
the International Criminal Court, the Ottawa Convention banning anti-personnel 
landmines, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Hague Convention for the Protection 
of Cultural Property and its Second Protocol”74. 
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Non-international conflicts are more likely to occur as stated above by the ICRC, and given that 
there are much fewer laws applicable in non-international conflicts, this guideline seeks to 
address that gap in international legislation.  
 
When the threshold for mass casualties and injuries is imminent:  
There are often warning signs of an attack. Whether it is a factional organization or a 
government, a violent uprising or crackdown can be foreseen.  
 
One of the justifications used for the Libyan intervention was Qadhafi’s use of the military 
against his people. The shocking nature by which he attacked his people left statesmen and 
political leaders clamoring for action. The unmerciful use of force conveyed the danger posed to 
the people of Libya. Qadhafi’s son Saif Al-Islam even equated the Libyan protestors to rats75; a 
warning sign of possible genocide. Gregory Stanton of Genocide Watch names Step 3 of 8 
towards possible genocide is “Dehumanization”76.  In Kosovo, ethnic cleansing was already 
occurring, and was going to continue unless foreign forces intervened. As stated in the country 
profile, Kosovo was too historically significant to succeed. Serbian forces were determined to 
regain control. Without intervention, ethnic cleansing and reverse ethnic cleansing would have 
continued.    
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When there is evidence of war crimes and crimes against humanity: 
Existing international law conveys that war crimes and crimes against humanity can occur in 
non-international conflicts. Legally defining violent uprisings or crackdowns as war crimes and 
crimes against humanity allows for greater repercussions77, and it allows the involvement of the 
international community. 
 
“The Rome Statute of the ICC adds force to the view that there are war crimes and grave 
breaches in non-international armed conflicts. The statute, in Article 8, War Crimes 
subparagraphs 8.2 (c) and (e), specifies sixteen ‘serious violations’ all but one of them 
war crimes or grave breaches that may occur in common Article 3 armed conflicts – in 
non-international armed conflicts.”78 
 
This thesis argues that where war crimes and crimes against humanity are occurring, 
international society must consider intervention. Although this guideline seeks only to serve as 
an aid in making the decision to intervene, it does also convey what is at risk should a coalition 
choose not to intervene. Syria is in disrepair and rife with violence, and yet the international 
community has chosen not to act79. The government of Bahrain has expelled, imprisoned, and 
tortured protesters80, but the international community has chosen not to act. The ‘duty’ to 
intervene is not yet a legal mandate, therefore when coalitions choose not to act, there are no 
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legal ramifications. Only moral questions remain, and those are questions states may choose to 
ignore or struggle with in cases of inaction81. 
 
Crimes against humanity are defined as criminal acts of war perpetrated against civilians in a 
conflict82. The crackdown that ensued in both countries has occurred against the general 
population, and they have been attacked by their countries’ military. The same occurred in 
Libya, although the crackdowns varied in intensity and violence, the cases in Bahrain, Syria, and 
Libya can all be classified as states where crimes against humanity occurred.  
 
Furthermore, the use of force in the case of Libya by Qadhafi may be classified as a crime of 
aggression, when the Rome Statute was reviewed in 2010, the ‘crime of aggression’ was added;   
 
“The “crime of aggression”83 is committed by leaders who plan or execute an act of 
aggression that constitutes “by its character, gravity and scale” a “manifest violation of 
the Charter of the United Nations”84”.   
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War crimes are defined as acts of war that are committed, which violate international laws85. In 
Kosovo, the Serbian forces violated rules of proportionality and military necessity, as well as 
carried out mass killings with forethought and conviction. The latter all violate international 
law86.  
 
“In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to 
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: 
 (a) Killing members of the group;  
 (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;  
 (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring  about 
its physical destruction in whole or in part;  
 (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;  
 (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.”87  
The Albanian Kosovars faced mass executions, and there was an attempt by the Serbian forces 
to exterminate the Albanian-Kosovar population. The situation in Kosovo should be referred to 
as genocide, not ethnic cleansing. Ethnic cleansing does not explain the gravity of the crimes 
that ensued in the former Yugoslavia. Genocide is a crime against humanity, and it should be 
recognized as such in the case of Kosovo. However, since the conflict was not classified as 
genocide at the time, the mass killings were enough to warrant as crimes against humanity and 
war crimes. Coalitions need to consider these factors when considering intervention.  It is 
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imperative to note that the ICJ did not classify the atrocities in the former Yugoslavia as 
genocide, but the Yugoslav tribunal did.   
 
When there is a credible threat to neighboring states:  
 
When a non-international armed conflict escalates, it threatens the people of that respective 
country, but it also threatens the security and stability of neighboring states, and its respective 
region88. Refugee crises are almost guaranteed to occur when a state is in turmoil, such as the 
mass exodus of people leaving Rwanda and flooding into neighboring Congo, Burundi, Uganda, 
and Tanzania89. This threat to neighboring states may be declared as a threat to international 
peace, and therefore a justified reason for intervention90. 
 
Refugee camps and settlements generally are in poor condition, imposing a serious burden upon 
the host state. Refugees are not all victims of atrocities, some are the culprits masking among 
refugees. Rwandan refugee camps in the Congo faced a multitude of attacks because some of 
the Hutu perpetrators were continuing to murder Tutsis91.  Host states are faced with a 
humanitarian crisis that may lead to their own instablity.  In Kosovo, the Roma population 
refugee camp was so dismal, it was found to be contaminated with lead92. In South Sudan, there 
has been a mass exodus from Sudan,   
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“Over the past two weeks thousands of refugees have crossed the border from 
Sudan into the newly independent South Sudan. This past Monday, November 
28, Doctors Without Borders/Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) started an 
emergency medical intervention in the village of Doro, some 40 kilometers [24 
miles] from the border where the refugees have fled fighting in Sudan’s Blue Nile 
State. An estimated 13,000 men, women and children have already arrived and 
the MSF team has seen thousands more walking with what possessions they can 
carry from the border area towards the gathering-point at Doro.93” 
Coalitions need to consider the consequences of inaction. If states do not form coalitions and 
act when a country is in turmoil, neighboring countries may bear the burden of a mass exodus of 
refugees who have few resources and will rely heavily upon their host state, which may or not 
be able or willing to take care of refugees. If a host state cannot withstand the refugee crises 
they had no part in creating, then the whole region may suffer. There are humanitarian and 
economic factors to consider from safety to public health to food and sanitary provisions; states 
must examine all possible consequences when making a decision.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusion and Limitations  
This thesis has sought to examine multilateral humanitarian intervention as a universal norm of 
international law and to analyze the decision-making process of humanitarian intervention; 
including the political and moral reasons, justifications, procedures, and criticisms for the 
interventions in Somalia, Kosovo and Libya to determine the existence of guiding 
commonalities. In addition, it has proposed model guidelines based on existing and emerging 
legal principles applicable in situations requiring humanitarian intervention.  
 
While attempting to fulfill the purposes of this thesis, limitations and multiple conclusions 
became apparent. The coming paragraphs will discuss the latter, followed by concluding 
remarks.  
 
Humanitarian intervention has been determined as a right of states but not an obligation: 
 
Scholars like Nicholas Wheeler and Jane Stromseth argue that humanitarian intervention will 
eventually be accepted as an international legal norm. Norms result from continuing and 
accepted state practices.  Should a future humanitarian intervention prove to be a catastrophic 
failure, its acceptance as a norm could be hindered thus derailing the current, more positive, 
outlook towards humanitarian intervention. This conveys the fragility of humanitarian 
intervention, but more importantly, the debates about the implications of humanitarian 
intervention remain contested. While Wheeler and Stromseth imply obligation of intervention, 
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Buchanan continues to assert that it is only a right, not an obligation of states to take part in an 
intervention.  
  
The concept of humanitarian intervention remains contested: 
 
Humanitarian intervention is controversial.  Depending upon the circumstances and perceptions 
concerning interventions vary, as an infringement on sovereignty, imperialistic, a return to 
colonization - or as valiant and heroic.  Realist scholars dispute the entire validity of the concept 
– arguing that states will not intervene unless in self-interest; that true international benevolent 
action is non-existent. Perhaps they would accept that proportionality is a more appropriate 
outlook towards intervention whereby states appreciate their self-interest, but recognize that 
international security and peace are imperative to their respective states.  
 
Humanitarian intervention may appear to be an idealistic measure due to its moral undertones 
and complexity, but it maintains as a course of action that benefits many parties and states. 
Although the cost for intervention is great, the benefits are also great. Ethnic cleansing and 
reverse ethnic cleansing were stopped by the NATO intervention in Kosovo, and starving people 
gained access food due to the Somali intervention. Every time a nation becomes more secure, it 
benefits the global community and the global economy.  
 
International law has not been able to keep up with the changes in international society and 
relations: 
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Achieving international consensus on humanitarian intervention is possibly one of the most 
critically needed developments in international law. With globalization, decreasing energy and 
water supplies, and climate change heighten the possibility of mass refugees, disasters, and 
internal and trans-border conflicts, a clear consensus on when the international community 
must intervene is vitally necessary.   
 
An accepted principle on intervention, however, directly counteracts five hundred years of 
international law development designed to protect state sovereignty and rights.  
Combined with decades of state actions devoted to colonization, Cold War engagements, and 
exploitation of other states’ resources, have virtually ensured individual and collective mistrusts 
of such a principle.   
 
International law has quite a long way to go to catch up with this ever-evolving world. Increased 
interdependence and globalization has led to a more connected world, which has led to more 
international legal legislation. International trade laws, maritime laws, and human rights laws 
have become more significant in a shrinking world. However, given the evolving nature of global 
society and technology, the need for international law is growing. That fulfillment of that need 
can be satisfied with new international legislation but the process has not kept up with the 
demand. International law will be altered, amended, and created but it is a long, arduous 
process. This extensive, long process is why so many critics are vocal about international law.  
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Public influence cannot be accurately measured: 
 
There is another factor that has great influence over a decision to intervene - the public. The 
public of a powerful or hegemonic state have the ability to influence their leaders to take action, 
and at times, they are the force that catalyzes the course of action, 
 
"Lieutenant General Wesley Clark looked to the White House for leadership. 'The 
Pentagon is always going to be the last to want to intervene,' he says. 'It is up to the 
civilians to tell us they want to do something and we'll figure out how to do it.' But with 
no powerful personalities or high-ranking officials arguing forcefully for meaningful 
action, midlevel Pentagon officials held sway, vetoing or stalling on hesitant proposals 
put forward by midlevel State Department and NSC officials"94. 
 
Although the level of influence a public has over its government cannot be accurately 
measured95 - the public’s influence is irrefutable. The intervention in Somalia was largely based 
on the public’s outrage over footage of starving women and children in the state in the horn of 
Africa - images that had a major impact of the consciousness of the American people – until the 
appearance of dead U.S. soldiers. If state governments refuse to intervene, or the public refuses 
to grant governments the support to intervene, humanitarian intervention will be limited.  
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The “Possibility of Success” undercuts the concept of humanitarian intervention: 
 
Principles of intervention and scholars, such as Wheeler, agree that intervention is illegal unless 
the prospect of success exists.  The purpose of this requirement is important - to ensure that 
states do not worsen a situation, or take the intervention decision lightly.  This concept, 
although generally accepted among the scholarship of intervention, undercuts intervention. 
When an intervention is deemed “humanitarian” then the considerations should be based on 
the human condition; suffering, forcible movement or number of civilian casualties – these 
should be the main considerations. 
 
This requirement should not undermine the need to ensure that sufficient political will and 
resources are put forth to ensure that humanitarian needs are met.   
 
Success is always possible; it is a matter of resources and commitment. Interventions should be 
carefully examined before being enacted. The initial consideration of success is unfair to the 
international community. A situation must be examined and studied, once it is determined how 
many resources it would call upon, then a coalition may make a decision to act or find alternate 
methods to influence the situation. 
 
It is unfair to ask a coalition of states to commit to an action that they cannot sustain, but it is 
also unjust to cast aside a crisis without truly examining the situation. Many critics of the 
intervention in Somalia state that it was an action that could have never succeeded, and yet the 
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international community took action anyway. The possibility of success needs consideration and 
reflection, but it needs extensive examination and no assumptions. 
 
Concluding Remarks: 
Humanitarian Intervention has and will continue to face obstacles. It is controversial when 
applied and controversial when it is not applied. Interventions in Somalia, Kosovo, and Libya all 
have their critics, but so does the inaction in Rwanda. This conveys the ongoing debate amongst 
scholars, and the public, concerning humanitarian intervention.  
 
In addition, there are countless questions raised in the specific implementation and 
authorization of humanitarian intervention. The UNSC did not approve the intervention in 
Kosovo, and scholars like Burton raise the question about whether the UNSC should even have 
that authority.  
 
Many questions remained unanswered, but that is partly due to this concept being so relatively 
young in comparison to other international laws or concepts, some of which have existed for 
five hundred years.  This thesis has sought to answer some of those questions, and propose a 
step forward with the guidelines in Chapter 5, but these suggestions are only an initial step 
towards clarifying the process of humanitarian intervention. Scholars often taught just cause 
when discussing an intervention action. Just cause is too vague of a term when discussing 
factors that will lead to an intervention. In order to create a more transparent process, specific 
guidelines like the ones included in Chapter 5 must be created and consistently followed. 
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In order for the discussion concerning intervention to move forward, the codification process 
must progress and application must become more consistent. This thesis holds the view that 
intervention is becoming more acceptable and is emerging as a norm in international law, as 
evident from historical precedent and scholarly analysis, but intervention has yet to receive 
universal approval. If the international community is going to commit to universal intervention 
ideals and processes, their actions, decisions, and authorizations must be consistent. 
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